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Abstract
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litigation costs/waste in financial distress; and [d] positively to accomplished
claim recovery by creditors (to which we present some preliminary favorable
empirical evidence). Under additional assumptions, measures of debt concentration relate [e] positively to intrinsic firm quality; [f] positively to creditor
monitoring and negatively to managerial waste; [g] positively to optimal continuation/discontinuation choices; [h] negatively to issuing marketing expenses.
In a signaling model, when concentration alone is not a sufficient signal, firms
choose the ultimately concentrated debt (i.e., a house bank) and have to pay a
high interest.
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I

Introduction

Coordination failure among multiple claimants, be they creditors or owners, is a
subject well-studied in the academic literature. Such coordination failures can lead
to takeover failures (Grossman and Hart (1980)) or bank-runs (Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Obstfeld (1996); Morris and Shin (1998); Morris and Shin (1999)), or generally
reduce the probability of successful renegotiation to a proposed reorganization plan
when renegotiation requires simultaneous assent by many claimants (Preece and
Mullineaux (1996); Hege (1997); Bergloef, Roland, and von Thadden (2000)). In many
of these models, the coordination failures aid the dispersed claimants. In a sense,
claimants cooperation has to be purchased with an offer that is attractive enough
for each and every claimant to choose to collaborate. Thus, coordination failure
can suggest that dispersed creditors or owners can receive higher settlements than
their hypothetically more concentrated but otherwise identical counterparts.
Zingales (1995) uses this insight to show that an entrepreneur may prefer to sell
a firm to dispersed owners in an IPO, who in turn can later obtain a higher price
for the shares from a potential acquiror than this entrepreneur could have obtained
by herself.1 In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the paper most interested in the
optimal concentration of creditors and thus most similar in goals to our own paper,
coordination failure is used to explicitly derive an optimal number of creditors: in
financial distress, two creditors can extract more surplus than one creditor. This
can deter inappropriate (strategic) default by management. However, coordination
problems can also make two creditors less likely to facilitate corporate continuation
when it is optimal. The optimal number of creditors is thus a coordination tradeoff
designed to approximate optimal termination/continuation.2
Yet, it is possible to draw a different conclusion from the fact that dispersed
creditors cannot easily coordinate. Dispersed creditors are first and foremost un1

Of course, it could be that being public raises the probability that this firm will appear on the
radar screen of potential acquirors.
2
Rajan (1992), Repullo and Suarez (1998), and others consider the tradeoff between a concentrated creditor’s ability to collect information and decide intelligently, and his worse ability to
negotiate a better settlement due to lower concentration.
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able to be proactive. Thus, even though they are at an advantage when positive
assent to a relief plan is required from every creditor, they are at a disadvantage
when active opposition to management’s relief plan is required. In this case, mutual
free-riding incentives weakens the overall outcome for dispersed claimants. A good
example of how dispersion can facilitate bondholder expropriation are Gertner and
Scharfstein (1991) and Bernardo and Talley (1996), in which management can use
exchange offers to expropriate wealth from uncoordinated creditors.
Our paper begins with a motivating pilot study from the New York State bankruptcy
court. In a sample of 63 bankruptcies, and adjusting for firm size, secured creditor
concentration helps secured creditors, and unsecured creditor concentration hurts
secured creditors in avoiding APR violations in favor of unsecured creditors.
Our model assumes that creditors must pro-actively seek to enforce their claims.
Our model is based on a conflict game, in which more proactive claimants can
achieve better outcomes for themselves. Conflict theory can be viewed as a reducedform method of modeling negotiations, which sidesteps the usually complex, often
asymmetric information games which underlie formal models of bargaining derived
from first principles (e.g., Rubinstein (1982)). In exchange for a certain ad-hocness
in the specification of how legal effort aids outcomes, conflict models sometimes
offer a more realistic description of empirical bargaining outcomes. Their reduced
form of modeling can provide interesting and relatively easily empirically testable
predictions. Conflict theory is by now an accepted mainstream method of modeling
(e.g., Hirshleifer (1978), Hirshleifer (1989), Hirshleifer (1991), Welch (1997), Rajan
and Zingales (1998), Bernardo, Talley, and Welch (2000) and many others).
In our model, multiple creditors have to negotiate with the entrepreneur in case
of financial distress. Our paper uses “management,” “equity”, and “entrepreneur”
interchangeably. Collection costs can stem from the costs of filing a claim, following
up through the bankruptcy process, investigating the firm’s true resources, communicating and negotiating with and pressuring management, hiring lawyers, bringing
motions to the court, etc. Management can establish procedures which make it difficult for its creditors to prove and recover their claims, or hire lawyers to outright
2

oppose APR (absolute priority rule). Indeed, a casual perusal of bankruptcy records
shows that it is not difficult to find examples of creditors who did not find it in their
interest to go through the legal hoops necessary even to file, much less to reclaim
relatively modest claims in Chapter 11.3 Further, civil liability claims are commonly
dismissed by the bankruptcy court altogether.
Such APR violations are consistent with our model, in which a larger number of
creditors suffers from more mutual free-riding, which in turn compromises their
ability to collect on their claims. De facto, our model argues that, given a fixed
level of debt, a distressed firm with a million uncoordinated small creditors is less
likely to be forced to pay its obligations than a firm with one creditor or a firm
with creditors that have a coordinating organ (e.g., a trustee for financial bonds).
Although we are thinking of idiosyncratic, small credit (such as small trade credit
[Biais and Gollier (1997), Petersen and Rajan (1997)]) as a good application for our
model, our model can also apply to public debt which is not fully coordinated or
even civil legal claims brought by product customers and other stakeholders.
The differences in collection ability allow us to derive an optimal concentration
of creditors. An entrepreneur who chooses a large number of creditors ex-ante
assures herself of better bargaining ability against creditors in case of financial
distress ex-post. Yet, in equilibrium, this costs the entrepreneur a higher interest
rate when raising the debt ex-ante.4 In contrast, an entrepreneur who chooses a
single creditor ex-ante will be forced to extensively (and expensively) negotiate with
this creditor in case of financial distress, and this creditor will likely be relatively
more successful in enforcing her claim. Yet, in equilibrium, such an entrepreneur
will also enjoy a lower interest rate when raising the debt ex-ante.
In our model, the ex-ante number of creditors determines both the ex-post distribution of cash flows in distress and the socially inefficient costs of claim collection.
3

An alternative to the conflict game would be to model collection costs of creditors directly, and
show that some effort by the firm would lead such creditors to not incur the costs of attempting
recovery. The implications of such a model are the same as those that we stress in our own paper.
4
In the case of customers who can recognize their lower ability to file civil suit in case the
product turns out to be defective, in lower product prices for an equally good product.
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The model shows that measures of debt dispersion (the number of creditors) correlates positively with the entrepreneur’s retention of the firm in bankruptcy (fewer
creditors ⇒ worse outcome for management in financial distress), and negatively
with the in-equilibrium claims collection costs (fewer creditors ⇒ more collection
efforts, costs, and waste).
In our simplest framework, the only deadweight cost of credit is the in-equilibrium
spending on conflict. Thus, by itself, this “number of creditors” tradeoff in financial
distress—in which more creditors in financial distress have lesser ability to wrestle
the firm from management—has a first-best outcome, in which the number of creditors is infinitely large. No collection costs would be incurred in financial distress,
and perfectly dispersed creditors receive proper ex-ante compensation (higher interest rates) for their perfect ex-post expropriation.
To solve an “optimal capital structure” model in which at least some firms find it
in their interest to choose a small number of creditors, there must be an offsetting
advantage to having fewer creditors. There are at least four applicable mechanisms
that can be invoked:

Signaling Firms may know whether they are of high-quality or low-quality. A firm
that chooses fewer creditors signals its higher confidence that it will not go
bankrupt and incur ex-post waste.
Fewer Creditors ⇒ Higher Inferred Firm Quality

Agency Management may be better kept in check by fewer creditors. Such creditors
have an incentive to invest more in monitoring activity even if the firm is not
in distress.
Fewer Creditors ⇒ Better Creditor Monitoring

4

Optimal Continuation/Termination Fewer coordinated creditors can respond better to make an intelligent decision of whether a firm in distress should continue
to operate.
Fewer Creditors ⇒ Better Termination Choices
This is the mechanism in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) (which however offers
diametrically opposite empirical implications to our own paper with respect to
the number of creditors). In a sense, this mechanism can be considered similar to value-enhancing agency monitoring, but after the firm enters financial
distress.
Simple Transaction Costs It may be more expensive to market debt claims to multiple creditors than it is to market them to just a few creditors.
Fewer Creditors ⇒ Lower Marketing Costs
Indeed, when our model is applied to product market liabilities/claims, it may
be exceedingly expensive for the firm to alter its market from few product
purchasers (imposing high distress costs) to just a few purchasers (with lower
distress costs).

Naturally, these factors may be simultaneously at work. For example, a single
firm may balance the costs of fewer creditors (i.e., incurring in-equilibrium conflict
waste) against a better inference about its quality drawn by the market, against
better efficient monitoring of managerial choices, and against a desire to ex-ante
commit to sometimes (and optimally) hand the firm to creditors in financial distress.
The model is kept deliberately simple, if only to avoid deceiving the reader into
believing that more algebraic generality could purchase significant more empirical
realism. Corporate finance models are often highly stylized and serve primarily
to show that the economic intuition is internally consistent—and our model is no
exception. Real life corporate decisions are complex and doubtlessly determined
by many unmodeled factors. In particular, the reader should recognize that there
5

can also be many situations in which dispersed creditors have more power, not
less power, e.g. as in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). In the end, it will be up to
the empirical evidence to measure whether and when dispersion weakens creditors
and when it strengthens creditors. Fortunately, creditor concentration is relatively
easy to measure empirically, which should permit empiricists to relatively easily
distinguish between the predictions of these models.
At times, we identify the most concentrated debt, i.e., a single creditor, as a
(house) bank. Although banks doubtlessly perform other functions, they do tend to
assume debt in a more concentrated fashion than public creditors. Thus, although
simplistic , it is quite likely that lack of dispersion is a good characterization of
one of the differences between public creditors and banks. In the signaling version
of our paper, when concentration (the most efficient signal) is exhausted, creditors
resort to paying excess rents to banks to assure separation. Thus, this version of
our model predicts that bank debt carries higher expected (not promised!) yields
higher than public debt.
Welch (1997) is closest to our paper, at least in its approach and technology. It
models the conflict between existing bank debt and public debt and comes to the
conclusion that if a company has already issued both kinds of debt, and it now
must decide which to make senior, it is the bankdebt which should be the senior
security. In Welch (1997), there is neither a role for equity, nor a role for multiple
creditors with equal fighting ability, nor explicit free-riding among creditors of equal
seniority, nor an endogenous determination of the number of creditors or type of
credit or excess interest rate. Indeed, Welch (1997) does not even consider the
entrepreneur’s choice between bank debt and public debt.
We shall now proceed as follows: Section II describes our pilot study, in which
we find that creditor concentration helped creditors in a particular situation. Section III describes the conflict game played between N creditors and management
in financial distress. This section solves the dynamic optimization from the perspective of management. The result of this section is that there is a monotonically
positive relation between debt concentration and in-equilibrium waste. Section IV
6

grafts onto this base model a signaling case in which higher-quality managers signal
their confidence by choosing fewer creditors. We also show that after concentration signaling is exhausted (i.e., the firm chooses only 1 creditor, a “house” bank),
entrepreneurs must resort to yield signaling. Section V outlines variant models
(agency, continuation, marketing) that similarly lead to an interior optimal creditor
concentration. Section VI discusses our empirical implications, contrasts them with
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and describes some evidence that is relevant to our
argument. Section VII concludes briefly.

II

A Pilot Study: Does Concentration or Dispersion Aid
Recovery?

In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), concentration hurts creditors. Because our model
will be consistent with the opposite implication (that concentration helps creditors),
we decided to conduct a pilot study.
We collected bankruptcy cases from the Southern District of New York (Manhattan, Poughkeepsie, and White Plains). The full text is available through the Public
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), an electronic public access service that
allows users to obtain case and docket information. We identified all the closed
Chapter 11 cases in the district as of August 2001, for which data on firm characteristics, creditors’ claims, and Chapter 11 resolution was available. We hand-coded
this information. Our data sample differs from earlier studies, because we include
smaller and private bankruptcies.
We found 63 cases with data on both APR violations and the number of secured
and unsecured creditors. Loans with both secured and unsecured components are
separated and their components are assigned into the correct categories. The earliest case in our sample was filed in July 1995, the most recent in July 2000. The
average firm size is $17.372 million, and the average value of liabilities is $34.488
million. In particular, we obtained information on the number of secured and un7

secured creditors, and on APR violations, if any. In our average firm, there are 3.5
secured creditors, and 174 unsecured creditors. APR is violated 3 times against
creditors in favor of equityholders, and 9 times against secured creditors in favor
of unsecured creditors.
Unsecured creditors are consolidated into one creditor committee. Secured creditors have to find their own mechanisms to coordinate their efforts. Define the “secured creditors outcome” as what was granted to secured creditors minus the value
of the secured claim or total assets (whichever is smaller), divided by the size of the
secured claim. (Although quoting outcome in percent already offers some size adjustment, our regressions also control for total assets.) A White heteroskedasticityadjusted regression among our 63 observations yields
Secured Creditors Outcome =
(p-value):

Mean:
Stddev:

0.11 –0.01 ·N S
(0.012) (0.025)

0.14
(0.32)

0.03

+ 0.39 ·(N U /1000) + γ1 · TA + γ2 · TA2 +
(0.010)

3.50

0.173

(0.19) (9.91)

(0.483)

(not significant)

with an adjusted R 2 of 6.0%.5 The negative coefficient on N S indicates that secured creditors receive a worse outcome the higher the number of secure creditors.
The positive coefficient on (N U /1000) indicates that the higher the number of unsecured creditors (divided by 1,000), the better the outcome to secured creditors.
However, unsecured creditors’s legal expenses are subsidized by the firm, and they
have a coordinating committee, indicating caution in interpreting the number of
creditors as a proxy for dischord. Nevertheless, the two relationships indicate to us
that concentration is a positive factor in the competition between secured and unsecured creditors. Put differently, creditor dispersion is not helpful. (Total assets
[TA] and total assets squared [TA2 ] are included as control variables, but are not
statistically significant.) A similar regression to explain the outcome for unsecured
5
We also tried a non-linear transformation, in which we estimated λ = 0.5 on a 1/(1 + N λ )
specification with 0.00 statistical significance. (The test of whether concentration is a positive or
negative influence is now that λ > 0.) Although the result is more significant and again in favor of
our theory, because the results are more difficult to explain, we report the simple linear regression
instead.
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creditors shows no significant variables.6
We also estimated a logit regression for violation of APR from secured creditors
in favor of unsecured creditors. Again, concentration indicates a stronger negotiation ability. In our data set, which also included many smaller non-public firms
(many of which were probably simply liquidated), there were only three APR violations in favor of equity. Thus, we cannot reliably report how creditor concentration
influenced negotiating ability relative to equity. Finally, we wish to reemphasize
that evidence does not reject Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) in other situations.

III

The Cost of A Given Number of Creditors

We begin with a simple “creditor concentration” model. Our primary intent is to derive the in-equilibrium costs/waste of claims collection as a function of the number
of creditors.

A

The Assumptions
Insert Table 1 here
[Table of Symbols]

Table 1 lists the symbols used in our paper. In stage 1 of the game, the entrepreneur owns in-place assets worth VOld . To adopt a project that provides 0 with
probability π and VNew with probability (1−π ), the entrepreneur must raise external
financing I (⇒ I > VOld ). We also assume that the project is intrinsically worthwhile,
i.e., (1 − π )VNew > I. This financing can be in the form of debt raised from an
(endogenously determined) number of creditors, N.7
6

Unsecured creditors are coordinated through a committee, and thus may act more like a single
creditor. In addition, their legal activities are subsidized by the court, allowing them to mount an
effective campaign more easily.
7
The model in this section finds a first-best solution. Thus, we could permit the firm to raise
capital via equity, and it would not improve the firm’s fate. When we introduce benefits to a limited
number of creditors in the next section, the firm voluntarily avoids the first-best solution, and thus
would avoid raising equity, too. Thus, omitting raising equity is without loss of generality.
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If the project later were to fail, the firm still owns its project in place, VOld . Although creditors “should” receive what the absolute priority rule (APR) promises
them, collection costs (such as courts, lawyers, and “legal maneuvers”) will allow
management to reduce creditors’ claims in financial distress by up to X. The fact
that financial distress is not free or ex-ante completely contracted away (Schwartz
and Watson (2000)), and that part of the function of lawyers is to influence courts
and obtain rents is reasonably realistic (Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Glaeser and
Shleifer (2001)). However, the specific details of conflict are extremely complex,
and thus our paper relies on a flexible, parameterized “black box.”8 To “fight” for X,
both creditors and management can devote effort. The exact allocation of X to management (equity) is determined by a contest success function. For example, equity
may grab fraction αe of the contested amount X if equity spends Le on debt collection avoidance/influence-seeking and debt spends Ld on debt collection/influenceseeking. We specify in
αe (Le , Ld ) =

Lλe
Lλd

+

Lλe

=

1
1 + (Ld /

λ
Le )

= α(Ld /Le )

.

(1)

λ (≥ 0) is a parameter which measures the relative effect of disproportionate spending, e is a mnemonic for equity, d for debt, and α(x) ≡ 1/(1 + x λ ). Our context
success function is a ratio function, as discussed in Hirshleifer (1989). The fraction
not allocated to equity, αd = 1 − αe , goes to the creditors:
αd (Le , Ld ) = 1 − αe (Le , Ld ) =

Lλd
Lλd

+

Lλe

=

1
= α(Le /Ld )
L
1 + ( e /Ld )λ

.

(2)

When α(Le /Ld ) = 1, the absolute priority rule prevails. When α(Le /Ld ) < 1, APR
is violated in favor of equity. α can be considered as a probability of holding onto
APR, or as a fraction of the disputed amount X that is allotted to debt in financial
distress, or both. The combination of a parametrized X with a contest success
8

Similar simplifying functional forms about underlying values and monitoring, as well as similar
assumptions about an inability to write complete contracts are often made in the monitoring
literature.
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function can cover a wide range of possible allocation scenarios.
Because legal effort goes beyond pure litigation, and extends to such out-of-court
activities as settlement negotiations and “fact finding,” we adopt the term “lobbying” instead of “litigating” in this paper. Both equity and creditors are assumed to
pay for their own lobbying expenses.9 One unit of lobbying (collection) costs cd for
creditors, ce for equity. As is the law, creditors in the same class must be treated
equally.10 Neither management nor creditors can commit not to act opportunistically in case of financial distress. Capital markets are perfectly competitive, the
firm is acting strategically. All participants are risk-neutral optimizers, and there is
no asymmetric information in the financial distress game. (Any asymmetric information is assumed to be fully captured by the known contest success function. We
will introduce a signaling component later in the paper.)

B

The Financial Distress Game

B.1

The Creditors’ Problems

First consider the problem of a single among N creditor if the firm enters financial
distress. Under full APR, he receives VOld /N , because VNew = 0 and this creditor has
first claim to the remaining firm’s assets, which are assumed to be insufficient to
cover the required investment. Under maximum violation, he receives VOld /N − X /N .
He benefits from both his own lobbying, denoted ld , and the lobbying of other
9

The insights of this paper are largely unaffected if the firm reimburses creditors and management for their legal costs (as in Chapter 11). This arrangement defacto subsidizes the legal
efforts of lower-priority claimants from higher-quality claimants. However, the algebra becomes
substantially more complex. See also Welch (1997).
10
If one were to allow creditors to compete with one another to collect from a limited amount
of funds, and management would pay off the loudest claimants in the same class but leave other
claimants dry, free-riding of creditors on one another would be mitigated. However, there would
then be a conflict game among creditors, and perhaps even a “run” (Diamond and Dybvig (1983))
on the firm’s assets. We focus on our simpler model only.
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h
i
creditors, denoted lo . (Recall that α Le /(ld + lo ) = αd is the fraction of X accruing
to creditors.) Thus, one single creditor maximizes with respect to ld

o V
i V  
X
Old
Old
L
L
α e /(ld + lo ) ·
+ 1 − α{ e /(ld + lo )] ·
−
− cd ld
N
N
N
h

=

n
h
io
VOld − 1 − α Le /(ld + lo ) X
N

− cd ld

.

(3)

This creditor’s first-order condition is
h
i
Le Xα0 Le /(l? + lo )
d
−
= cd
2
N(l?
+
l
o)
d

.

(4)

Note that all creditors are equal. Thus, a minimal equilibrium condition is that
?
?
?
l?
o = (N − 1)ld and aggregate creditor collection effort is Ld = N · ld .

B.2

The Management’s Problem

Unlike creditors, management does not suffer from a free-riding problem. Under
APR, management receives 0. The entrepreneur maximizes with respect to Le in
financial distress (i.e., VOld − I + (1 − π )VNew are sunk costs, and we are only investigating the bankruptcy payoffs, which occurs with probability π ):


h

i
α Le /Ld · 0 + 1 − α Le /Ld · X − ce Le

(5)

Her first-order condition is

−

h ?
i
Xα0 Le /Ld
Ld

12

= ce

.

(6)

B.3

The Joint Solution

Solving the two first order conditions, we find that the in-distress equilibrium choices
are
L?
e =−

α0 cd NX
ce2

l?
d =−

α0 X + ce lo
ce

(7)

?
Using L?
d = N · ld , it follows that

N=

ce L?
e
cd L?
d

.

(8)

Thus, if there is one creditor and the fighting costs are equal, both debt and equity
will fight equally hard for X. However, if there are two creditors, management will
spend twice as much as debt on lobbying effort in equilibrium. This is due to the
free-riding among creditors in spending money on claims collection.
Equation 8 further allows us to replace the endogenous choice variables in the
contest success function in equilibrium with known parameters. Define
K≡N



cd
ce



.

(9)

?
so Le /L? = K. (If we assume that creditors are not intrinsically better at fighting
d

than management, i.e., if cd ≥ ce , then K ≥ 1.) Consequently
h ?
i
h ?
i
α Le /(l? + l? ) = α Le /L? = α(K)
d

o

d

.

(10)

where α(K) is the allocation fraction favoring of creditors. (A higher K means a
lower α, which makes creditors happier.)
We shall now return from arbitrary ratio functions back to the specific ratio
function in eq. 1. Substituting eq. 10 back into the first-order conditions eqs. 6
and 4, we can eliminate α to find that
L?
e =

"

λK λ
ce (1 + K λ )2

13

#

·X

(11)

and
L?
d =

"

λK λ−1
ce (1 + K λ )2

#

·X

.

(12)

In equilibrium, deadweight waste W is
?
W ? (N) ≡ cd L?
d + ce Le =

"

λ(N + 1)K λ
N(1 + K λ )2

#

·X

.

(13)

Asymptotically, the waste in this conflict game is smaller when there are significant asymmetries in strength between the debt and equity contestants, i.e., when
K (which itself embeds N!) and λ are large. Here, creditors are weakest when their
number is high. Thus, a very large number of creditors can drive in-equilibrium conflict costs to zero. This also implies that it is sufficient if cd is not much less than
ce , i.e., as long as creditors are not intrinsically better fighting for the potentially
reallocable component X than management and thus K ≥ 1, waste is lower when
N increases above 1.11 This enhances asymmetry. Although the exact derivative of
waste with respect to N depends on the ratio between cd and ce (see subsection C),
asymptotically, as N → ∞, waste W ? (N) → 0.
As in all models of competitive credit provision, the entrepreneur internalizes
these ex-post waste costs in equilibrium. Thus, without any other considerations
which could induce the entrepreneur into restricting the number of creditors, having
as many creditors as possible maximizes the entrepreneur’s firm value.12
Remember that K ≡ N cd /ce . Not too surprisingly, the comparative statics discussed below
can reverse locally if cd << ce , i.e., if creditors were far more efficient at producing a unit of legal
influence than management. Doubling the number of creditors in such situations can drive cd · N
close to ce .
12
We are ignoring the side condition management that the entrepreneur may have to sell more
than 100% of the firm to raise the necessary credit.
11
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C

The Ex-Ante Price of Debt

To obtain credit of I, which is assumed necessary to finance the project, an entrepreneur has to offer debt face value F V that satisfies


?
I = π · α? VOld + (1 − α? )(VOld − X) − cd L?
d + (1 − π ) · F V

,

(14)

?

where α? ≡ α(Le /L? ) = 1/[1 + K λ ] = 1/[1 + (Ncd /ce )λ ] is the in-equilibrium fracd

tion of X that creditors expect to receive and L?
d is given in eq. 12. The first term
is the expected payoff to creditors in bankruptcy, the second term is the promised
payoff to creditors outside of bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, the claimants can recover
VOld , the assets in place (because the value of the new project VNew is worthless), net
of their in-equilibrium reduction due to managerial ex-post opportunism and net of
their own fighting costs. We also assume that F V ? ≤ VOld + VNew , so that the firm is
able to pay off the debt in the non-bankrupt state.13
Solving for F V ? , the in-equilibrium solution for the face value of debt, is

FV? =

n
h
1
I + π K λ X 1+K
λ +

λ
N(1+K λ )2

i

− VOld

o

1−π

.

(15)

Note that, given our formulation, if X is very large and α? → 0, the term “creditor”
is almost a misnomer. In financial distress, such creditors would not receive very
much at all. They would effectively be more of a residual claimant than equity itself.

D

The Ex-Ante Entrepreneur’s Problem

The Entrepreneur is maximizing equity’s value (E) today, i.e.


?
E ≡ π · α? · 0 + (1 − α? ) · X − ce L?
e + (1 − π ) · (VOld + VNew − F V )

(16)

13
It is sufficient if λ < λ, where λ is defined by K λ (λ − 1) < 1. λ is usually a high number, so
this constraint is rarely an issue.
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with respect to the number of creditors. A quick check shows that in financial
distress, E + I = VOld − W ? (N); if the project is successful, E + I = VOld + VNew .
The first-order condition of E with respect to N is a long algebraic expression,
but it is easier to derive the sign of the comparative statics from the insight that
entrepreneurs internalize all waste in a competitive capital market, i.e., from eq. 13
:
E ? = VOld + [−I + (1 − π ) · VNew − π · W ? (N)]

.

(17)

As N → ∞, E ? converges to the first-best VOld − I + (1 − π )VNew . The interesting
comparative statics are
∂E ?
∂X
∂E ?
∂K
∂E ?
∂N
∂E ?
∂(cd /ce )
∂E ?
∂λ

= −π
"
=
=
=
=

"

λK λ (N + 1)
(1 + K λ )2 N

#

<0

,
#


λ2 K λ−1 (K λ − 1)(N + 1)
X
π
>0
,
(1 + K λ )3
N
∂E ? ∂K
·
>0
,
∂K ∂N
∂E ?
∂K
∂E ?
· c
=
·N >0
,
∂K ∂( d /ce )
∂K
"

#  
K λ (N + 1) λ(K λ − 1) log(K) − (K λ + 1)
X
π
λ
3
(1 + K )
N

(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
.

(22)

These equations state that the entrepreneur is better off if when cd >> ce , X is
small, and N and λ are large. There is no clear comparative static with respect to
the decisiveness parameter λ: for small values of K and λ, it can be negative. As
either K or λ becomes large, the derivative of E ? with respect to λ is positive.
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IV

Creditor Concentration and Financial Distress Conflict In a Capital Structure Model: A Signaling Model

Almost all theories of capital structure center around the effects of an increase in the
expected costs of bankruptcy (probability of and waste in) when the firm takes on
additional debt. Our model is no exception. It merely identifies the deadweight costs
of bankruptcy as the waste of socially inefficient claims collection, and it relates this
specific cost of debt to the number of creditors.
To obtain an equilibrium in which some firms are willing to incur these financial
distress costs in equilibrium, there must also be some advantages to the otherwise
disadvantageous debt choice to a finite number of creditors. We now discuss four
different mechanisms: signaling (in some detail) in this section; and agency, optimal
termination/continuation, and marketing costs in the following section.

A

A Revised Model

In the prior model, there was no drawback to the use of multiple creditors. Creditors were maximally expropriated in financial distress, but compensated ex-ante
for being ex-post expropriated.
Now, consider the presence of two different kinds of firms: good, high-quality
(G) firms with a lower probability of bankruptcy (πG ), and bad, low-quality (B) firms
with a higher probability of bankruptcy (πB ).

B

Signaling With The Number of Creditors

Signaling works if there is a differentially higher cost for low-quality firms to send
the signal. To deter imitation, high-quality firms therefore want to minimize corporate payoffs if they enter financial distress. These payoffs are lower if [a] litigation waste upon financial distress is higher and [b] entrepreneur’s relative (post-
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litigation) share of the firm is lower. Having fewer creditors accomplishes both
objectives. Thus, signaling through creditor concentration is a relatively efficient
separation mechanism.
We have set up the problem intentionally so that the signaling equilibrium is easy
to construct. Because signaling equilibria are well understood, we shall be casual
on formal equilibrium definitions, and just focus on the pareto-dominant signaling
equilibrium. For the sake of brevity, we shall also treat integer constraints on the
number of creditors rather casually.
In a separating equilibrium, the low-quality entrepreneur prefers revelation to
imitation. Revelation provides the low-quality entrepreneur with her full-information
first-best proceeds of
VOld − I + (1 − πB )VNew

.

(23)

To achieve this, the entrepreneur would offer highly dispersed (public) debt. Imitation would provide a potentially cheating entrepreneur with


πB · α? · 0 + (1 − α? ) · X − ce L?
e + (1 − πB ) · (VNew + VOld − FVG )

,

(24)

where the FVG indicates that an out-of-equilibrium imitating low-quality firm can receive the high-quality firms’ price of credit (based on the good firm’s distress probability πG , not the imitator’s true distress probability πB ). FVG is given in eq. 15. A
reasonable signaling equilibrium emerges in which the difference in profits between
a cheating and a truthful low-quality firm, i.e., the gain from imitation (GFI), are


GFI ≡ πB · (1 − α? ) · X − ce L?
e +(1−πB )·(VNew +VOld −FVG )−[VOld − I + (1 − πB )VNew ]
(+)

(−) in equilibrium

=

z

1−

}| 

λ
πB − πG
1 + Kλ


z

{
1
1 − πB
1+
·
N
1 − πG
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λ

K
1 + Kλ

!

}|
{

πB − πG
X+
(I − VOld )
1 − πG


(+)

=

z


}|

must be (−) in equilibrium

{z


KλX
1 − πB
πB − πG
πB − πG
(I − VOld ) +
λ
1 − πG
1+K
1 − πG






}|  
{
λ
πG 1 − πB
−
πB +
·
1 + Kλ
N 1 − πG
(25)


is just below zero. ∂GFI/∂N is a complex expression (because K embeds N). However, we do know that larger numbers of creditors are preferred when there is no
signaling, and the low-quality firm’s outcome does not depend on N if it confesses
its identity. (The optimal N for revealing bad firms is infinity.)
∂GFI
>0
∂N

(26)

Thus, a potential low-quality imitator has less to gain from imitation when there
are fewer creditors. For the signaling equilibrium to have a solution in which the
low-quality firm is indifferent between imitating and not imitating, the right part of
eq. 25 must be negative.

C

Comparative Statics

For the most part, the comparative statics are messy, but straightforward. The task
is easy, because we have constructed the model so that the number of creditors
only matters in the cost of sending the signal (N), not in the benefits of the signal.
The comparative statics are determined by the incentive compatibility constraint
to prevent low-quality firms’ imitation. Appealing again to our side condition that
?
cd ≥ ce , the sign of the implicit differentiated (∂N /∂·) is the opposite to the sign
?
of (∂GFI/∂·). (Using the implicit function theorem, ∂N /∂· = −∂GFI/∂·/∂GFI/∂N .
?
Consequently, sign(∂N /∂·) = −sign(∂ GFI/∂·).)

New Opportunities Value VNew : VNew is irrelevant.
∂GFI
=0
∂VNew

⇒
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∂N ?
=0
∂VNew

(27)

Preexisting Firm Value VOld : If VOld is high relative to I, high-quality firms need to
sell little debt and prefer to simply wait instead. Thus, imitation is relatively
less attractive, and N can be larger. Formally,
∂GFI
πG − πB
=
<0
∂VOld
1 − πG

⇒

∂N ?
>0
∂VOld

(28)

Thus, N ? increases when firms have more assets in place (VOld ).
New Opportunities Cost I: If VOld is high relative to I, high-quality firms need to
sell little debt and prefer to simply wait instead. Thus, imitation is relatively
less attractive, and N can be larger. Formally,
∂GFI
πB − πG
=
>0
∂I
1 − πG

⇒

∂N ?
<0
∂I

(29)

N ? decreases when firms have to raise more money to take the project (I).
Disputable Amount X: The signaling schedule requires a fixed cost to potential
imitators. If X is large, the fixed imitation prevention cost can be achieved
with more creditors. Formally, X appears only as a factor in the term that
must be negative so that GFI? = 0. Consequently
∂GFI
=
∂X







λ
1
1 − πB
πB − πG 1 +
1−
·
1 + Kλ
N
1 − πG
∂N ?
>0
∂X

⇒
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Kλ
1 + Kλ

!

<0

(30)

Firm Bankruptcy Probabilities πG and πB : If good firms never go bankrupt, πG =
0, good firms know they must never bear ex-post negotiations, so the lowest
number of creditors imposes the highest cost on bad-quality firms. Alternatively, when πG is close to πB , bad firms have little incentive to imitate (there
is little to be gained), and thus N can be large.
Formally, if the difference between firm types tends to zero, we know that GFI
could not be positive (N here can be finite):
KλX
1 + Kλ

πB = πG = π ⇒ GFI = −

!

λ
1 + Kλ




N +1
π ≤0
N

Therefore, for GFI? = 0, for πB > πG , it must be that the gains to imitation
decrease in the probability of bankruptcy for the good firm (∂GFI/∂πG < 0),
and increase in the probability that the bad firm goes bankrupt (∂GFI/∂πB > 0).
After all, GFI is a monotonic function of both πB and πG for 0 ≤ πB < 1,
0 ≤ πG < 1. Consequently
⇒

∂N ?
> 0,
∂πG

∂N ?
>0
∂πB

.

(31)

Effective Entrepreneurial Advantage K: If resistance is futile (too costly for creditors), then high-quality firms find it more difficult to obtain enough creditor
resistance to induce the low-quality firm not to follow. Thus, to signal, a highquality firm needs to choose even fewer creditors when cd /ce and thus K is
large.
Formally, the partial derivative ∂GFI/∂K is positive. First note that because
K ≥ 1 ( cd ≥ ce and N ≥ 1), then K λ ≥ 1, ∀λ ≥ 0. Therefore
∂GFI
∂K

 


 ∂ K λ X
1 − πB
λ
πG 1 − πB

1+K λ 
=
πB − πG
−
π
+
·


B
1 − πG
1 + Kλ
N 1 − πG
∂K
!
#
"
KλX
πG 1 − πB
λK λ−1
+
πB −
·
(32)
2
1 + Kλ
N 1 − πG
1 + Kλ
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h λ−1
i
 λ

λ

And ∂ (K X)/(1 + K ) /∂K = λK
/ 1 + K λ 2 X. Therefore
∂GFI
∂K

#
 

 "
1 − πB
λ
πG 1 − πB
λK λ−1
=
πB − πG
−
πB +
·
2 X
1 − πG
1 + Kλ
N 1 − πG
1 + Kλ
!"
#


KλX
λK λ−1
πG
1 − πB
π
+
+
·
2
B
1 + Kλ
N
1 − πG
1 + Kλ
"
#"



#
1 − πB
λ(K λ − 1)
πG 1 − πB
λK λ−1
πB − πG
=
+
πB +
·
X > 0 (33),
2
1 − πG
1 + Kλ
N 1 − πG
1 + Kλ




h
i
because πB > πG (1 − πB )/(1 − πG ) ≥ πG /N ·(1 − πB )/(1 − πG ), and K λ ≥ 1.
Thus it follows that
∂N ?
<0
∂K

⇒

∂N ?
>0
∂ce

∂N ?
<0
∂cd

.

(34)

Fighting Decisiveness λ: The sign with respect to λ is ambiguous, as it was in the
no-signaling comparative static eq. 22.

These comparative statics should be unsurprising to connoisseurs of signaling
models. They are determined by the self-punishing mechanisms necessary to deter
low-quality imitation.

D

Signaling By Debt Pricing And Debtor Concentration

When separation by choice of creditors is insufficient, entrepreneurs may have to
underprice their debt, i.e., pay a relatively high interest rate. Interestingly, this has
a direct implication: Even though the required yields on highly concentrated bank
debt can be lower than those on dispersed public debts (to allow for banks superior
ability to defend their APR), banks earn excess rents (positive expected returns) from
their loans made. This is not to purchase bank services, but to assure separation.14

14
Necessarily, we would expect competitive banks to compete these rents away (e.g., through
higher fixed costs).
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Proposition 1 When firms can use either yields or creditor concentration for signaling, two choices emerge in equilibrium:
1. The firm offers fairly priced debt to a creditor base, concentrated or unconcentrated.
2. The firm offers good-deal debt to a single concentrated creditor (bank debt).
In particular, the firm will not offer good-deal debt to public creditors.
The proof is in the appendix.

The intuition is that signaling with creditor con-

centration is the more efficient signal: it inflicts pain when the firm goes bankrupt,
which is more likely to happen to a low-quality firm. When the signal is exhausted,
i.e. N = 1, which we interpret as bank debt, a high-quality firm then must pay
a higher price for credit to separate. High bank debt interest rates do not arise
from credit-rationing or poor quality or the purchase of monitoring services, but
instead from high-quality, high uncertainty, and the need to separate from other
firms! Naturally, in real life, banks probably both monitor and permit signaling.

E

A Numerical Illustration of The Signaling Model

For easy checking, Table 1 contains some numerical values that help gathering intuition. We use as parameters X = $80, I = $100, VOld = 80, VNew = $250, cd = ce = $1,
λ = 1.5, πB = 0.5, and πG = 0.4. Note that, under full APR violation (which happens
with probability 1 − α? ), creditors are fully expropriated by equityholders.
In the non-signaling case, suppose there is only one type of firms, that is π = 0.5.
The optimal solution is for the firm to set N = ∞ ⇒ α? = 0. The face value of
the debt equals FV = $200, and Ld = Le = 0. Profits to equityholders are E ? =
π X + (1 − π )(VOld + VNew − FV) = $105, which equals the full information value
VOld + (1 − π )VNew − I (after paying off creditors).
Suppose this was the bad firm (πB = 0.5), and there is a good firm in the market,
with πG = 0.4 now. Its full information value would be $130 (see Table 1). The high23

quality firm prefers to have a lower number of creditors. Its optimal N ? solving
eq. 25 is N ? = 2.26 (' 2). This is costly, because if the high-quality firm goes
bankrupt, Ld = $9.31, Le = $21.06, and α? = 0.22. However, because the firm
borrows from a fewer number of creditors, F V = $160.76 (creditors know now
that they will recover more in the bankrupt state). Consequently, the high-quality
firm’s equity value is E ? = $117.84. The difference between this amount, and the
full information value of the good firm, $12.15, is the signaling cost. Note that, by
imitating the good firm, the bad firm would be worth
πB [(1 − α? )X − ce Le ] + (1 − πB ) [VOld + VNew − F V ? ] = $105

,

exactly its full information value. In equilibrium, there are no incentives for the
bad firm to imitate the good firm. There is no need for the good firm to signal with
the debt yield r , because we know, from Proposition 1, that signaling with creditor
concentration alone is preferred.
Suppose instead that the good firm is in fact very good, and πG = 0.2. Thus,
its full information value is $180. As in the previous example, the optimal N ?
solves eq. (25), and N ? = 0.188. This is impossible, so the firm must set N ? = 1.
There would still be gains from imitation for the bad firm, because by imitating the
good firm with N ? = 1, the bad firm pays FV = $122.5, α? = 0.5, Le = Ld = 30,
and GFI = $3.75. The good firm needs to additionally increase the debt yield to
r ? = 6%. Now FV? = $130, with α? = 0.5, Le = Ld = 30 (with one creditor and one
entrepreneur, the legal expenses for both are equal if their cost is also equal). The
higher face value restrain the bad firm from imitation, since imitation yields
0.5 ($40 − $30) + 0.5 ($80 + $250 − $130) = $5 + $100 = $105

,

exactly the full information value of the bad firm. For the good firm, however,
separation yields
0.2 ($40 − $30) + 0.7 ($80 + $250 − $130) = $2 + $140 = $142
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.

This is still lower than its full information value $180. The cost of signalling has
therefore increased to $38.
Insert Figure 1 here
[In-Signaling-Equilibrium Regions]

Figure 1 shows the two regions for which it is optimal to signal with either N
only, or with N and the debt yield r . For πB > 0.6, at least the bad firm’s (and
possibly also the good firm’s) project has a negative NPV, so a signaling equilibrium
makes no sense. The upward sloping curve solves πG as a function of πB in (25),
where N ? = 1. N ? becomes larger as πB and πG become closer. When r ? > 0, the
debt yield decreases as both probabilities of default become closer.
Insert Figure 1 here
[In-Signaling-Equilibrium Promised Yields]

Figure 2 plots the promised rate of return ( FIV − 1) to creditors of the good firm
for different levels of creditor concentration. For any value of N to be optimal, we
let πB = 0.5, and allow πG to vary. As N → ∞, the face value of the debt tends to
$200, and therefore the promised rate of return tends to $200/$100 − 1 = 100%.
In the figure, the expected yield r ? would be zero for N ? > 1. For N ? = 1, the yield
can range from 0% to 45%.

V

Alternative Mechanisms

A

An Agency Model Alternative

It would be similarly easy to embed ex-post financial lobbying costs into an agency/monitoring
model instead of a signaling model. In such a model, although a single creditor can
fight better and thus cause more waste in financial distress than multiple creditors,
he would also be assumed to monitor management better. As before, the costs of
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fewer creditors is more waste in bankruptcy. The benefits of fewer creditors would
depend on the functional form determining
(−)

(+)

(−)

∂V ∂M
∂V
=
·
∂N ∂M ∂N

(35)

where V is firm value, M is the amount and quality of monitoring, and N is the number of creditors. The in-equilibrium tradeoff would be that fewer creditors would
monitor better (increasing firm value and/or reducing the probability of distress),
but also cost more in financial distress.
Depending on the functional specification of agency benefits, an interior solution
could emerge in which firms more in need of monitoring would be more willing to
live with fewer creditors. The comparative statics are straightforward:
1. N ? decreases (facilitating more monitoring) when the value to monitoring
(∂V /∂M ) is high.
2. N ? increases (facilitating less monitoring) when it is difficult to influence the
aggregate monitoring by choosing the number of creditors (∂M /∂N ).
As is typical, many of the comparative statics of signaling models are different
from those of agency models—but with both theories relying on variables that are
difficult to observe (or which by definition must be unobservable), it is often difficult
to empirically distinguish between the two.

B

An Optimal Continuation Alternative

In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the costs of more creditors is mutual free-riding
when it comes to the ex-ante efficiency of the ex-post optimal continuation choice
(terminate if termination is optimal; continue if continuation is optimal). The fighting tradeoff considered in our paper could also be embedded in such a model. If a
single creditor were able to wrestle the firm from management in financial distress,
26

he could internalize the continuation choice. Thus, fewer creditors would mean
more claims collection waste, but better continuation choice. The comparative statics would depend on the creditors’ ability to internalize the continuation choice.
(Empirical evidence to the continuation/termination choice can be found in Kahl
(2001) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998).)
In contrast to Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), however, fewer creditors obtain
more, not fewer resources in financial distress in our model. Consequently, the
tradeoffs are different: creditors intrinsically prefer coalescing, management is ambivalent. In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), creditors intrinsically prefer dispersing,
and management has to try to prevent this to preserve firm value.

C

Marketing Costs

It requires little explanation to point out that finding multiple creditors may, under
some circumstances, require more effort than finding a single creditor. Multiple
creditors may require more shoeleather and road shows than a single creditor or
bank. A single creditor may also find it easier to conduct the normal due diligence
than many dispersed creditors. To raise the same amount of funding might thus
be costlier through multiple creditors. If this assumption about costs of finding
creditors is correct, the model predicts that entrepreneurs trade off the marketing
costs of more creditors against the waste costs of fewer creditors.

VI

Implications

The intent of our approach is not to stress the monitoring, signaling, continuation
or transaction cost aspects. These have already been treated in other literature and
thus are probably familiar to the academic reader. Instead, our intent is to stress
the consequences of the assumption that spending money on lobbying/lawyers can
better one’s position in financial distress.
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Insert Table 2 here
[Comparison With Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) Model of Creditor Concentration.]

The main intuition and empirical implication of our approach are summarized
in Table 2: Dispersed creditors are at a relative disadvantage in financial distress.
Coordination and free-riding costs among creditors allow the firm to escape some of
their contractual obligations. Put succinctly, concentrated and/or coordinated creditors spend more on lobbying and representation than dispersed creditors. Thus,
they receive a better settlement than unconcentrated debt would. To respond to
concentrated debt, management also spends more on lobbying in equilibrium. The
more creditors, the more management spends relative to the aggregate creditor legal expenses, but the less management spends in absolute terms. Aggregate waste
is lower when creditors are dispersed.
Our model also predicts that there are incentives for creditors to concentrate
ex-post. Concentration enhances creditors’ bargaining power. It is true that this
implications can be generated within other contexts. For example, in Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996), it could be that creditors could choose to concentrate in order to
avoid inefficient liquidation. But, under other parameters, this theory could suggest
that creditors could choose to diffuse in order to avoid inefficient continuation. In
this sense, our own implication is more robust.
Holding the amount of debt constant, firms which choose a low creditor concentration ex-ante do so in order to later have an ability to expropriate them ex-post.
Thus, small creditors demand a promised premium for offering credit to such firms.
Bank debt requires less of a promised premium. However, in the signaling variant of
our model, banks also may earn positive rents, which is required for the high-quality
firm to separate.
The implications of our model are relatively sharp, and different from those
in which diffuseness helps creditors (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)). As already
mentioned in the introduction, we believe that small credit (such as trade credit)
and debt that is uncoordinated by a strong bond trustee are the prime applications
for the model.
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A

Existing Empirical Evidence

Naturally, there are no tests for our theory, yet. Indeed, with the exception of our
pilot study above, we failed to find evidence relating APR violations to creditor concentration. But we did find evidence relating the duration of the workout period to
creditor concentration: Helwege (1999) analyzes junk bond defaults in the 1980s.
Her abstract summarizes the findings relevant to us: “bondholder holdouts are not
a significant problem, as firms with proportionately more bonds have shorter default spells...bargaining problems arising from contingent liabilities, lawsuits, and
size delay the process, although multiple bond classes do not. Neither information problems nor firm value appear to matter.” Of course, time holdout is not
necessarily a good measure of settlement, although it is indicative of the presence
of shareholder holdout issues. The lack of time holdout is thus not necessarily a
smoking gun, but it is hint that creditor holdout issues are perhaps not too important.
Brunner and Krahnen (2001) find that creditor pools increase the probability
of workout success, and that coordination costs are higher when there are more
creditors. However, they do not determine if such pools improve or worsen the
settlements obtained by creditors.
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) find that vulture investors became more prominent in the 1980’s and 1990’s. These vulture investors serve many roles, and not
all of them are proactive. Still, the paper suggests that vultures can enhance not
only their own claims (both for their class and for themselves), but also the firm’s
overall value, by actively pressuring management. The very fact that active vultures
purchase large blocks in financial distress, often from dispersed claimants, seems
to indicate at least that the claimant’s loss of bargaining power may not be drastic
and/or outweighed by the creditors’ gains from “undispersing” themselves.
There is some disagreement as to the extent of the direct costs of financial distress. The order of magnitude of direct court-filed fees are about 2-4% of the value of
assets (20% of the market value of equity), depending on whether one includes costs
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of failed workouts and exchange offers, etc. Lubben (2000) reviews the evidence and
provides some new evidence. In a sample including mostly mid-size companies,
debtor’s expenses for attorneys tend to be about $680,000 (mean), $300,000 (median). Adding accountants and investment bankers roughly doubles these figures.
Creditor Committees spend about $230,000 (mean), $70,000 (median). Accountants
and investment bankers add only about 50 percent more. (If we use these figures to
calibrate our model, this implies an effective creditor diffuseness of about N = 3.)
However, in “ten [of 22] cases in the sample the United States Trustee was unable
to appoint creditors’ committee, most often because of lack of interest among unsecured creditors” [p.530]. The article also points out cases in which businesses
misjudged the difficulties of complying with code requirements, and thus were denied reimbursements for their claims; and lack of understanding of and frustration
with the Bankruptcy Code by businessmen.
Although we believe that financial contracts can be and often are written in a way
to mitigate legal costs, there are instances in which priority changes unexpectedly.
In such cases, one can get an indication of the (usually) out-of-equilibrium costs of
litigation. Anderson (1987, p.442) describes the Manville asbestos experience, in
which customers unexpectedly received priority over creditors in bankruptcy
An Institute for Civil Justice–Rand Corp study estimates that for every
dollar paid to injured claimants, nearly two dollars are spent on litigation expenses. More specifically, of the total amount paid by producers
and insurers, 37 percent was received by plaintiffs, 26 percent by plaintiffs’ attorneys, and 37 percent was spent by producers and insurers on
defense costs.
Even though our model has situations in which (high-quality) issuers like higher
litigation costs in order to deter low-quality issuers, a calibration of our model indicates that we would not expect to see such legal costs in equilibrium. Indeed,
for the most part, our model predicts relatively moderate expenses and only some
APR violations. The Manville experience is supportive of our argument only inso30

far as it indicates that out-of-equilibrium legal costs can be quite significant, and
that observed legal costs may be small by intent, i.e., by choice of the mechanisms
considered in our and other papers.
In sum, although there is little evidence that directly relates creditor (claimant)
concentration and coordination to the ultimate settlement (except that presented
above in our paper), there is good evidence that creditors often coalesce in financial
distress. Although coalition-forming could be (partially) to avoid a “creditor run on
the firm” and to enhance firm value, it is also possible that this coalition-forming
serves to increase (not decrease) the relative bargaining strength of creditors.

VII

Conclusion

Our paper has reexamined the question posed in the Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
JPE paper regarding the optimal number of creditors. We have taken an alternative
approach to offer an intuition and a set of implications that differ from those of our
predecessor. Thus, empiricists can easily test Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) against
our own theory: For one, our mutual alternative is not just an unspecified straw man.
For two, creditor concentration is a relatively easily empirically accessible variable.
Our pilot study has found preliminary evidence that creditor concentration helps
rather than hurts.
Although banks are undoubtedly unique among many dimensions, the fact that
bank credit is typically very concentrated is among its more unusual features. A
variant of our model offered the specific implication that even though promised
yields on bank debt may be higher or lower than comparable public debt, bank debt
may offer (single) banks excess rents.
Again, even among public creditors, concentration and coordination measures
are relatively easy to obtain. We thus hope that our theory will be put to further
empirical work—and preferably by third parties which are less likely to be suspected
of trying to find evidence in support of their own model.
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A

Proof of Proposition 1: Signaling With Debt Pricing
and Concentration.

This appendix proves that the firm prefers to use only the number of creditors for signaling, if
possible, and uses interest rate signaling only after bumping against the N = 1 limit. We need to
modify eq. 14 to accommodate non-zero debt yields:


I · (1 + r ) = πG α? VOld + (1 − α? )(VOld − X) − cd Ld + (1 − πG )FVNY

,

(36)

where the superscript NY on FV reflects the fact that the good firm uses both N and the debt yield
as signals. Hence
FVNY =

I(1 + r ) − πG [VOld − (1 − α? )X − cd Ld ]
1 − πG

.

(37)

Separation will occur as long as GFINY = 0, where GFI is, from eq. 25:


GFINY = πB (1 − α? )X − ce Le + (1 − πB )(VNew + VOld − FVNY ) − [VOld − I + (1 − πB )VNew ] = 0 (38)
Substituting FVNY with his value:
GFINY

=

=



πB (1 − α? )X − ce Le


I(1 + r ) − πG [VOld − (1 − α? )X − cd Ld ]
+(1 − πB ) VNew + VOld −
1 − πG
− [VOld − I + (1 − πB )VNew ]


X(1 − α? ) + I − VOld (πB − πG ) − (1 − πB )r I
− [πB (1 − πG )ce Le + (1 − πB )πG cd Ld ]

=

0

(39)

Setting this expression to zero defines the signaling equilibrium (N ? , r ? ). Solving for r ? as a
function of N ? :
r? =

h
i
?
[X(1 − α? ) + I − VOld ] (πB − πG ) − πB (1 − πG )ce L?
e + (1 − πB )πG cd Ld
(1 − πB )I

(40)

NY
?
?
r ? depends on N ? through α? , L?
d , and Le . Substitute the value of r into FV :

FVNY =



I
πB
+ πB (1 − α? )X −
(VOld + ce L?
e)
1 − πB
1 − πB
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(41)

Finally, substitute FVNY into the expression for E (from equation (16?)):
E NY

=
=



NY
πG (1 − α? )X − ce L?
e + (1 − πG )(VOld + VNew − FV )





πB − πG 
1 − πG
?
ce L?
−
X(1
−
α
)
+
(V
−
I)
+ (1 − πG )VNew
Old
e
1 − πB
1 − πB

(42)

b r = 0) dominates the equilibrium
In terms of entrepreneurial proceeds, the equilibrium (N,

(N ? , r ? ≠ 0) defined in eq. 39. This is because E NY increases with α? , but is indendent of r .
Thus, any equilibrium with both signals is dominated by an equilibrium of the type (N, r = 0), as

long the latter is feasible (i.e., does not run into the N = 1 constraint).15
When N ? = 1: We now consider when N alone is not sufficient for the firms to separate (i.e.,
even with N ? = 1). We now show that the firm needs to additionally increase the debt yield to
induce separation. To characterize this equilibrium, let us define
α1 =
1+

1
 λ
cd
ce

,

(43)

that is, the value of α when N = 1. In this case, the entrepreneur offers debt with face value such
that:
h
i
I(1 + r ) = πG α1 VOld + (1 − α1 )(VOld − X) − cd L1d + (1 − πG )FV??
Because N = 1,
L1d

 λ−1
c
λ cde
=

 λ  2 X
c
ce 1 + cde

.

.

(44)

(45)

Solving for FV?? :

FV?? =

h
i
I(1 + r ?? ) − πG α1 VOld + (1 − α1 )(VOld − X) − cd L1d
1 − πG

(46)

Therefore separation will occur as long as the bad firms find the gains from separation equal to
zero.
h
i
GF I ?? = πB (1 − α1 )X − ce L1e + (1 − πB )(VNew + VOld − FV?? ) − [VOld − I + (1 − πB )VNew ] = 0 (47)
15

The single-crossing property also assures us that the high-quality firm prefers to adhere to the
equilibrium over pretending that it is a low-quality firm.
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The last two equations define r ?? as a function of the parameters in the model, together with the
condition that:
h
i
GF I = πB (1 − α1 )X − ce L1e +(1−πB )(VNew +VOld −FVr =0,N=1 )−[VOld − I + (1 − πB )VNew ] > 0 (48)
This equation states that N = 1 is insufficient to separate (profits from imitation are greater than
zero). That is, separation with N only is not enough, even for N = 1.
It is also the case that signaling with N = 1 and r ?? is preferred to signaling with r alone:
From eq. 42, E(1, r ?? ) > E(∞, r ), where E(∞, r ) is the value of equity when the firm optimally
signals with r alone.
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Table 1. Table of Symbols

Symbol
VOld
VNew
V
X

Explanation

Example
VOld = $80
VNew = $250
→ V = $330
X = $80

Value of Assets in Place
Value of New (Extra) Project in Non-Distress (Zero in distress).
VNew + VOld
Amount that can be lobbied for in financial distress

I
π
πG
πB

Cost of Extra Project. VOld + VNew > I > VOld
Probability of Distress, generic
(Signaling Game:) Probability of Distress for Good Firm.
(Signaling Game:) Probability of Distress for Bad Firm.

λ
ce
cd

Conflict Decisiveness Parameter in α.
unit cost of lobbying for equity.
unit cost of lobbying for debt.

I = $100
π = 40%
πG = 40%
πB = 50%
λ = 1.5
ce = $1
cd = $1

Solutions in Signaling Model for High-Quality Firm
Le
Ld
ld
lo
α
≡ α(Le , Ld )
N
E
FV
GFI

Contest Success Function, allocation of X between equity and debt,
depending on exerted lobbying effort.
Number of Creditors (Endogenous Choice Variable).
Entrepreneurial Profit
Debt Face Value
Gains from Imitation in Signaling Model
(Full Information Value: $130 ⇒ Cost of Signaling: $12.152

Side Conditions
(1 − π )VNew ≥ I
X ≤ VOld
N∈I
cd ≥ ce
0<λ<λ

→ L?
e = 21.067
→ L?
d = 9.313
→ l?
d = 4.117
→ l?
o = 5.196

Lobbying Effort by Equity (Management, Entrepreneur) for X.
Aggregate lobbying effort by all creditors for X.
Lobbying effort by a single creditors for X.
Lobbying effort by other creditors for X.

The project is worthwhile.
Only a part of the firm value can be lobbied for.
There are no negative or fractional creditors.
Management’s lobbying costs are no higher than creditors’.
Facilitates sensible contest success function.
where λ is defined by K λ (λ − 1) < 1.
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→ α = 0.227
α(21.067, 9.313)
→ N ? = 2.26
→ E (N = 2.26) = 117.85
→ FV? (N = 2.26) = 160.76
→ GF I ? = 0
?

Figure 1. In-Signaling-Equilibrium Regions
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Figure 1 plots the regions in which signaling by creditor concentration alone signals
creditor quality and in which signaling requires not only the ultimate concentration
(N = 1, i.e., bankdebt), but also an expected interest above zero. The parameter
values for this figure are as in our numerical examples: VOld = $80, VNew = $250, X =
$80, I = $100, ce = cd = $1, and λ = 1.5. A positive interest rate is required when
πg < πb (λ − 3)/2λπb − λ − 3. If (1 − πB ) · VNew < I, i.e., when πB > 0.6, the new
project is not a positive NPV project.
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Figure 2. Signaling Equilibrium Promised Yields
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Figure 2 plots the promised rate of returns as a function of the optimal number of
creditors. (To obtain different optimal number of creditors, we vary πG . [Changing
πB would have the same effect.]) When N > 1, this is simply the yield required
to offer creditors a zero expected rate of return. (For numerical convenience and
to keep in-text computations easy to repeat, we are working with numbers that
produce unrealistically high promised yields.) The expected yield is always zero,
except when N = 1. Not plotted: When N = 1, i.e., (house) bank debt, the expected
yield can range anywhere from 0 to 45%. (The promised yield would thus be higher.)
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Table 2. Comparison With Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) Model of Number of
Creditors

Relationship

BS 1996

BW 2001

Low Concentration
( Public Debt )

more APR:
Creditor-Friendly Settlement
Firm Unfriendly Settlement

less APR:
Creditor-Unfriendly Settlement
Firm Friendly Settlement

High Concentration
( Bank Debt )

less APR:
Creditor-Unfriendly Settlement
Firm Friendly Settlement

more APR:
Creditor-Friendly Settlement
Firm Unfriendly Settlement

Concentration vs. Corporate Termination

Less Frequent

Undef

Concentration Vs. Promised Interest Rate

High or Undef

Low

Zero

Zero (or Positive)

Negative

Undef

Bank Debt Vs. Expected Interest Rate
Concentration Vs. Holdout (Time)
Concentration Vs.
penses

Creditor Lobbying Ex-

Undef

Higher

Concentration Vs.
Firm

Lobbying Expenses of

Undef

Higher

Concentration Vs. Total Lobbying Expenses

Undef

higher

Ambiguous

Higher
(except with add-on)

Negative or Ambiguous

Positive

Uncover Value

Seek Rents

Concentration Vs. Inefficient Outcome
Concentration Incentives for Creditors ExPost
Lawyer Expenses

Note: Public Debt is assumed equivalent to highly dispersed debt. Bank Debt is assumed
equivalent to highly concentrated debt.
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